Former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel released her new book containing quite interesting insights into Greece’s financial crisis and her relationship with the country’s prime ministers, particularly Alexis Tsipras, at the time.
Angela Merkel’s memoir, Freedom: Memories 1954-2021, was released on November 26th in thirty countries.
The book offers readers a deeply personal and political reflection on Angela Merkel’s career as one of Germany’s most defining chancellors of the post-war era. Already a bestseller based on pre-orders, it delves into the most pivotal moments in European politics, all seen through the lens of a German leader.
Merkel’s account includes her interactions with a total of three Greek prime ministers, who dealt with the Greek financial crisis—George Papandreou, Antonis Samaras, and Alexis Tsipras.
Through candid anecdotes and detailed accounts of her experiences, Merkel sheds light on her role as a de-facto European leader at a time when the entire European Union was being challenged on multiple fronts.
Merkel spends a significant amount of time in her book focusing on the European debt crisis and, more particularly, on Greece’s financial crisis.
In her book, she recounts her unique experiences with other fellow European leaders and their discussions behind closed doors during the Greek bailout negotiations. Her reflections in her memoir show how frustration, political challenges, and moments of unexpected friendships defined her tenure as the leader of Europe’s largest economy.
Merkel’s recollections on Greece start with George Papandreou, the socialist Prime Minister of Greece from 2009 to 2011. Her first meetings with him were during the early bailout phase, which were marked by utter exasperation, as the entire Eurozone faced the tangible danger of imminent collapse.
Merkel describes their initial meetings as clearly unproductive, noting that George Papandreou and his team were defined by a lack of decisive plans to address Greece’s dire economic situation. This shows how unprepared the then government of PASOK was and how dire the financial situation of the country had been during the last years of the center-right Karamanlis government succeeded by that of Papandreou.
For instance, when asked about his strategy to restore market confidence by saving four percentage points of GDP, Papandreou requested more time. Merkel recalls finding his response astonishing given the urgency of the crisis.
Major communication challenges made the situation worse, according to Merkel, with discussions switching between multiple languages as interpreters struggled to keep up with the leaders trying to find common ground during the initial negotiations in early 2010.
Merkel’s account clearly shows her frustration with what she perceived as a lack of urgency on behalf of the then government of Greece and concrete action from Papandreou during this exceptionally difficult time for Greece and the European economy.
In contrast to her detailed accounts of other leaders, Merkel’s portrayal of the next Greek prime minister, conservative Antonis Samaras, is surprisingly brief and critical.
Samaras led a coalition government between his conservative New Democracy party, the social democrat PASOK party, and the small, left-wing “Democratic Left” party.
Merkel attributes the Samaras government’s lack of success to their failure to fully implement the reforms required under Greece’s second bailout program. According to the former German chancellor, this was a key factor in the Greek public’s pervasive anger.
This public discontent was what ultimately paved the way for the first-ever left-wing government to be elected in the country with Alexis Tsipras’ rise to power. Merkel’s laconic stance on Samaras shows that her view of his tenure was simply a missed opportunity to stabilize Greece and its position in the Eurozone.
The relationship between Angela Merkel and Alexis Tsipras, leader of the left-wing SYRIZA party, is portrayed with much more detail and depth in her book, showing how much Tsipras’ firebrand approach fascinated and even scared the major European players in 2015.
In her memoir, Merkel recalls her first official meeting with Tsipras, Greece’s Prime Minister at the time, in Berlin in March 2015:
“His arrival was delayed because he deemed it necessary to get out of the car in front of the Chancellery and personally greet the protesters from the Left Party (Die Linke). The chants of ‘Long live international solidarity’ reached my ears from afar. I only hoped his stay there wouldn’t last long enough to overshadow the atmosphere of his visit before it even began.”
“Tsipras did indeed arrive soon and got out of the car with a friendly, disarming smile. I greeted him and made a brief comment about his preliminary schedule. He confidently and diplomatically replied that one should never forget their supporters. I agreed with a smile.”
Despite their strong differences, Merkel describes Tsipras as a politician who was approachable and open to dialogue.
Their initial discussions ranged from political negotiations to personal topics such as family life, creating an atmosphere of cautious cooperation, as both sides were trying to identify the areas where Athens and Berlin could find common ground.
Merkel also provides fascinating insights into Tsipras’ strategic approach during the summer of 2015, when Greece faced the real possibility of ultimately exiting the Eurozone, referred to as “Grexit.”
Furthermore, Merkel recounts being effectively stunned by the decision of the Tsipras government to hold a referendum on the EU’s proposed bailout terms on July 5, 2015.
According to Merkel, this was a move that caught European leaders entirely off guard.
While Merkel initially viewed this as a dangerous and destabilizing gamble that could see Greece crashing out of the Eurozone and potentially the EU, she later recognized it as part of Tsipras’ long-planned and calculated effort to demonstrate to Greek citizens that his government had exhausted all options before breaking its electoral promises and agreeing to austerity measures.
Merkel explains in her book that Tsipras informed her and French President Hollande that the Greek government had decided to hold a referendum on the terms of the bailout program. When asked by Merkel what the Greek government was going to ask the Greek people to vote, Tsipras told her “No, obviously.”
“Of all the phone calls I’ve ever made in my political life, this one probably surprised me the most. For a moment, Hollande and I were speechless,” she admits.
Merkel also sheds light on the dramatic negotiations between Greece and the EU in July 2015. These ultimately secured Greece’s place in the Eurozone, with the agreement of the third and final bailout program.
Merkel describes how Tsipras brought expert negotiators to the table following the referendum, leading to an agreement that included significant financial support and extended repayment terms for Greece’s older loans.
Reflecting on this tumultuous period, Merkel claims in her book that Greece and its eventual survival within the Eurozone was not merely an economic necessity but also a political imperative for Europe, as the country, known as the cradle of democracy, is especially significant for the region.
Merkel concludes her reflections on Greece with the defining moment of January 2019, towards the end of her tenure as a German leader, when she dined with Tsipras at a seafood restaurant in Piraeus during her first official visit to Greece after the end of the bailout programs.
Merkel and Tsipras then revisited the events of 2015, with Tsipras explaining how he had sought to convince Greeks that his government had fought hard against austerity while preserving their country’s Eurozone membership.
Merkel acknowledges in her book that this balancing act ultimately strengthened both Greece and the Eurozone as a whole.
